Abstract. This paper analyzes the distortionary effects of positional preferences when labor supply is exogenous under both a welfarist and a paternalistic government. Extending the prior literature, reference levels may be partially exogenous to the government (e.g., determined by consumption choices in a foreign country), and individuals may be positional with respect to wealth in addition to consumption. Neither consumption-nor consumption-cum-wealth positionality needs to cause inter-temporal distortions under either welfare criterion. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for non-distortion of positional preferences. If those conditions are not satisfied, the same reference levels of consumption and wealth can give rise to under-saving or to over-saving -depending on the extend to which the reference levels are exogenous to the government. Moreover, we provide conditions for which positional preferences for wealth and consumption imply over-consumption with respect to the welfarist criterion but, at the same time, over-saving with respect to the paternalistic criterion.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the distortionary effects of positional preferences with respect to both consumption and wealth.
1 By positional preferences we mean a situation in which households not only derive utility from own consumption and wealth, but also from own consumption and wealth relative to some consumption-and wealth reference levels. These reference levels are exogenous from the viewpoint of a household, and partially endogenous from the view of the government. 2 In particular, we have the following case in mind. For a given economy, a part of the reference level can be explained by choices within that economy. For example, the average consumption level in an economy might represent an important determinant for one's consumption reference level. 3 While an economy's average consumption level is exogenous to any individual, it is fully endogenous to a social planner, that is, a government that designs an optimal allocation (or an optimal policy) according to some welfare criterion. However, there might be further determinants for reference levels that are not explained by the model itself. Most notably, these can be foreign consumption-or wealth levels, as transmitted by social media and television on a daily basis. We consider these determinants to be exogenous to a social planner. As argued in this paper, the "endogenous-exogenous composition" of the reference level turns out to be critical for the nature of a possible distortion (over-or under-saving) caused by positional preferences.
We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for positional preferences to be non-distortionary. In our simple Ak framework labor is exogenous. That is, the
nature of the distortions we analyze is inter-temporal (in contrast to intra-temporal distortions when labor supply is elastic). In evaluating distortionary effects, we consider a paternalistic government in addition to a welfarist government. This is warranted, as several authors, including Sen (1979) or Harsanyi (1982) , argue that it is questionable to include anti-social preferences, such as envy, in a social welfare function. Private preferences are suitable for a government objective function only if they are laundered (Goodin, 1986) . Their arguments call for a paternalistic welfare function that does not consider positional preferences. However, other authors are more positive to include positional preferences in a welfare function (Piketty and Saez, 2013, p.453) . 4 In this paper we neither adopt a welfarist nor a paternalistic view. However, we are interested in studying the distortions possibly caused by positional preferences, as viewed through both lenses -that of a welfarist government as well as that of a paternalistic government. In this paper, we argue that -together with partial exogeneity of the reference levels as discussed abovethe same reference levels can imply over-saving according to one welfare criterion, and, at the same time, under-saving according to the other welfare criterion.
But are positional preferences significant at all? We argue that they are. Social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behavior. This was already shown by Darwin (1871) , who emphasized sexual selection besides natural selection. "To spread across the population, genes of sexual species not only need to survive in their natural and social environment, but also need to be or appear a more attractive mating partner than their same sex competitors." (Truyts 2010 way (1998, 2005) . A recent brief discussion is provided in Wendner (2014) .
We present several contributions with respect to the prior literature. First, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for positional preferences not to impose a distortion (according to either a welfarist or a paternalistic government).
In a framework without wealth-dependent preferences, the prior literature argues that, positional preferences have no impact on the steady state equilibrium -therefore also not a distortionary impact -once labor supply is exogenous. 5 We show that this claim holds true only under the condition of constancy of the degree of positionality (as discussed in the proceeding section below). Once this condition is violated, consumption positionality is distortionary in spite of exogenous labor supply. 6 Moreover, in contrast to Nakamoto (2009), we show that consumption positionality does not imply a distortion once preferences are wealth-dependent.
Specifically, once the consumption positionality matches the wealth positionality, positional preferences do not cause an inter-temporal distortion. 7 Second, we consider a paternalistic welfare criterion in addition to a welfarist one. 6 We also show that existence of a balanced growth path does not imply the constancy-ofmarginal-degree-of-positionality condition.
7 Few other papers address the distortionary effects of positional preferences. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006) consider an Ak model in which habit-forming households exhibit positional preferences for consumption. Though, Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006) focus on the interaction between relative consumption and habits, this paper works out conditions when households are concerned with both relative consumption and relative wealth. Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) work out the conditions for the case of endogenous labor supply and positional concerns for both consumption and leisure. This paper focuses on positional preferences with respect to consumption and wealth, with exogenous labor supply. Ghosh and Wendner (2017) consider a functionally specified framework with wealth dependent preferences. They do not, however consider a general framework. None of the aforementioned papers considers partial exogenous reference levels or a paternalistic government.
in the presence of positional preferences, discussing a paternalistic welfare criterion.
However, all of these papers are very much in the spirit of the optimal non-linear income tax tradition with heterogeneous households. None of these papers, though, consideres either a dynamic setting, or a preference for wealth or partially exogenous reference levels. Third, we address the impact of the "endogenous-exogenous compositions" of the reference levels on the nature of distortions implied by positional preferences. To this end, we demonstrate that positional preferences may give rise to one distortion (like over-saving) according to a welfarist government, while giving rise to the opposite distortion (under-saving) according to a paternalistic government. To the best of our knowledge, no other authors have addressed and systematically investigated this case before.
To summarize, this paper extends the prior literature with respect to three dimensions. First, households may be positional with respect to wealth in addition to consumption. Second, a household's reference levels is only partially explained by endogenous consumption-and savings choices within the economy. A part of the reference level is exogenous, e.g., determined by choices in a foreign country. As such, the unexplained part of the reference level is also exogenous to the government (social utility function). Third, the distortionary effect of positional preferences is evaluated according to both welfarist-and paternalistic welfare criteria. Exploiting this extended framework, we show three main results. The presence of consumptionand wealth positionality does in no way necessarily imply a distortion. Even the presence of wealth in the utility function does not imply that a consumption externality is distortionary, once the degree of positionality with respect to wealth matches the one with respect to consumption. Next, for given consumption-and wealth reference levels, our model gives rise to both under-saving and to over-saving -depending on the extend to which the reference levels are exogenous. Additionally, we provide conditions for which positional preferences for wealth and consumption imply under-saving with respect to the welfarist criterion but, at the same time, over-saving with respect to the paternalistic criterion. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the endogenous growth model (with inelastic labor supply) for both the market economy and the social optima. Section 3 derives conditions for non-distortionarity of positional preferences.
Moreover, for the cases in which these conditions are not satisfied, the section investigates the nature of distortions under welfarist-and paternalistic welfare criteria. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The Model
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy that allows for fully endogenous growth. Endogenous growth stems from constant returns to capital (Ak model). Time is considered to be continuous. There is a large number of households and firms, the respective number of which we normalize to unity.
Households are homogeneous and exhibit positional preferences. They derive utility not only from own consumption but also from own consumption relative to some consumption reference level, and from own wealth relative to some wealth reference level.
Preferences
The representative household has preferences for consumption c, relative consumption ∆ c ≡ c −c, wealth k, and relative wealth ∆ k ≡ k −k. Relative consumption is given by individual consumption relative to some consumption reference levelc, and relative wealth is given by individual wealth relative to some wealth reference level k. Both reference levels (c,k) are exogenous from the point of view of an individual household.
The consumption-and wealth reference levels are determined by two factors.
The first factor is mean consumption,c h , and mean wealth,k h , in the economy (where superscript h suggests home economy). As households are homogeneous, mean consumption and mean wealth represent natural determinants for the reference levels. Importantly, these determinants are endogenous from the point of view of the government (social planner). The second factor is not explained by our model itself -it is exogenous:c f ,k f . These "foreign" reference levels are determined by interaction via social media or by television broadcasting, none of which is explained endogenously in our model. Importantly, these determinants are exogenous even to a (welfarist or paternalistic) government. In what follows, we specify relative consumption ∆ c and relative wealth ∆ k as
Parameters α i and β i , i ∈ {h, f } determine the explained (endogenous) versus not explained (exogenous) parts of the positional reference levels. The standard case of fully endogenous mean value comparisons is implied by α h = 1, α f = 0 and
In this paper, both relative consumption and relative wealth enter the utility function. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
In the standard model, u c (c, ∆ c , k, ∆ k ) > 0, and u i (c, ∆ c , k, ∆ k ) = 0 for some i ∈ {∆ c , k, ∆ k }, where a subindex refers to the partial derivative: wealth reference level, a rise in own wealth raises relative wealth, thereby it raises own utility. The time index t is suppressed, unless necessary to avoid ambiguities.
Throughout, we assume that the utility function (3) is strictly quasiconcave, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c and weakly increasing in all other arguments.
The intertemporal utility function, U , as viewed from date t = 0, is given by:
where ρ is the household's constant pure rate of time preference.
Technology
A homogeneous output, y, is produced by capital according to the linear technology (Rebelo 1991) :
where y is gross production per capita, and k is capital per capita. The depreciation rate of capital is δ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume (A−δ) ≥ ρ to ensure nonnegative endogenous growth. Moreover, there is no population growth.
Market equilibrium
Let the superscript m indicate a market (decentralized) equilibrium. Households choose a consumption stream so as to maximize intertemporal utility (4) subject
Differential equation (6) reflects the flow budget constraint of the representative household. Restriction (7) is obvious; every household is required to base her plans on the initial value of her wealth. Notice that (6) and (7) hold for both the market framework and a social optimum (as discussed below). Restriction (8) reflects the fact that individual households consider the positionality reference levels as exogenous. Finally, (9) is the transversality condition.
For the market economy, the current value Hamiltonian is given by:
where the costate variable µ m represents the shadow price of capital. An interior solution implies the following first-order conditions:
where we made use of the fact that
from the point of view of an individual household. For the decentralized economy, an equilibrium path is characterized by (6), (7), (9), (11), and (12).
Before discussing the welfarist-and paternalistic governments' problems, it turns 
The degree of positionality defines the fraction of utility gain from an additional unit of consumption stemming from a rise in relative consumption ∆ c . A value of zero indicates no positionality at all, while a value of unity indicates that only relative (not absolute) consumption matters.
Likewise, we define the marginal degree of positionality with respect to wealth by
Welfarist Government
Let the superscript w indicate variables associated with a welfarist government's choice problem. A welfarist government respects individual preferences. Specifically, it respects consumption and wealth positionality of households. In contrast to individual households, the government takes into account that in equilibrium
. However, bothc f andk f are considered exogenous. That is, from the point of view of the government,
The welfarist government chooses a consumption stream so as to maximize intertemporal utility
subject tok
Restrictions (16) - (19) have the same interpretations as those given for the market economy. The main difference with respect to the decentralized framework is the fact that the social planner takes the reference levels (18) into account.
For the welfarist government, the current value Hamiltonian is given by:
An interior solution implies the following first-order conditions:
and an equilibrium path is characterized by (16) , (17), (19) , (21) , and (22).
Paternalistic Government
Should the government accept positional concerns in its welfare criterion? Concerns for status and relative position are a form of jealousy and envy and one can question that such behavior has to be respected by the policy maker. In this subsection, we set up the paternalistic government's problem. The government knows that households care about status but it does not include positional preferences in the social welfare criterion. That is, the government's and households' preferences differ (cf. Kanbur et al. (2006) for an excellent discussion, in a survey article on nonwelfarist optimal taxation).
In our framework, a paternalistic government does not fully respect individual preferences. In particular, it neglects positional preferences, that is, it considers relative consumption and wealth as exogenous: ∆ c =∆ c and ∆ k =∆ k , where
In other words, the paternalistic government evaluates an equilibrium allocation as if households had no positional preferences at all. In the following, variables related to the paternalistic government's choice problem are indicated by the superscript p.
Based on the current value Hamiltonian
an interior solution implies the following first-order conditions:
Positional preferences: efficiency and distortions
In this section, we address two cases. The first case is the special case in which households have positional preferences only with respect to consumption. We develop a necessary and sufficient condition for positional preferences to be nondistortionary and consider the type of distortion occurring when this condition is not satisfied. As a side, we develop an existence condition for a balanced growth path and show that existence does not imply efficiency (even for our framework with exogenous labor supply). The results developed are essential for analyzing the general second case, in which households have positional preferences with respect to both consumption and wealth. In the latter framework, we show that both the type of government (welfarist versus paternalistic) and the exogenous-endogenous composition of the reference levels play decisive roles for whether or not positional preferences are distortionary and if so, whether the distortion causes under-or over-saving.
Positional concerns with respect to consumption
In this subsection, we focus on the case: u ∆ k (.) = 0. This is the case in which households are not concerned about others' wealth levels, i.e., households may be positional with respect to consumption but not with respect to wealth. However, households may be concerned about own absolute wealth, in which case u k (.) > 0.
In order to sharpen our results, we distinguish u k (.) = 0 from the case u k (.) > 0 in the following.
No preference for wealth
We compare the equilibrium path of a market economy with those of the welfaristand paternalistic governments. From (12) , (22) and (30), we see thaṫ
that is, the growth rates of the shadow prices are identical, and constant, in all three frameworks (decentralized, welfarist-, and paternalistic government). Efficiency then implies that µ m = φ w µ w = φ p µ p , with both φ w and φ p being constants.
From (11), (21) and (29), we can identify
who are constant if and only if the utility function is homogeneous of some degree R in (c, ∆ c ), and the term ∆ c /c is constant.
Assumption (A1). The positionality term ∆ c /c is constant.
Considering the definition of ∆ c in (1), Assumption (A1) is equivalent to requiring the reference levelc f to be proportional to c. In fact, we assumē
where the parameter restriction ensures that in equilibrium ("ex post") relative consumption ∆ c in fact increases in c. We consider Assumption (A1) to be a weak assumption, as it merely refers to a a co-movement between the home-(endogenous) and foreign (exogenous) components of the consumption reference level. 
, and φ p = (1 + κ). In the following, we assume (A1) and (A2), that is,
where we make use of the fact that both u c and u ∆c are homogeneous of degree (R − 1) by Euler's theorem. The parameter restriction R < 1 ensures positivity of endogenous growth, as shown below.
If and only if Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied, the balanced growth path of the decentralized economy is efficient, that is, it coincides with the one implied by either the welfarist-or the paternalistic government.
The endogenous growth rate of consumption and capital, g, is given by
.
Proof. See appendix. The parameter restrictions, particularly R < 1, ensure positivity of the endogenous growth rate. As seen in Proposition 1, the growth rate is sensitive with respect While consumption positionality has an impact on the equilibrium (c/k, g), the impact is not distortionary, according to Proposition 1. We conclude this subsection by noting that existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency.
Proposition 2. Existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 reveals two important findings. First, there exist balanced growth paths for which (A1) and (A2) are not satisfied. In fact, as shown in the appendix, existence of a balanced growth path requires the utility function to be of the following form: In what follows, we show that the result of Proposition 1 is not robust with respect to preferences for absolute wealth (when, in addition, households are not wealth-positional).
Preference for wealth:
In contrast to the previous subsection, we allow households to have a preference for wealth. Here, households care about own wealth, u k (.) > 0, but they have no positional preference for wealth, u ∆ k (.) = 0. We relax this assumption in the subsequent subsection. To sharpen results, though, we distinguish preferences for absolute wealth from positional preferences for wealth (when u ∆ k (.) > 0).
The steps followed here and in the next subsection resemble those of the above discussion -with the right adjustments, though. There is no change with respect to the marginal utilities of consumption, as given by (11), (21) and (29) . With u k (.) > 0, (12) , (22) and (30) become: 9 Brekke and Howarth (2002, p.142) argue that "we have established that augmenting a standard neoclassical growth model to incorporate a concern for relative consumption has no impacts on long-run economic behavior." Fisher and Hof (2000, p.249) show that the result that "relative consumption does not affect the long-run steady state...is robust with respect to the specification of the instantaneous utility function." Liu and Turnovsky (2005, p.1106) state that "[w]ith exogenous labor supply, consumption externalities, which impact through the labor-consumption tradeoff, have no channel to affect steady state output" in a framework with neoclassical production. Rauscher (1997, p.38) argues that "conspicuous consumption does not affect the long-run steady state."
Following the above arguments, for these Euler equations to be satisfied, it is necessary that the right hand sides coincide. Inspection of the right hand sides of (34), , i ∈ {w, p} for some t, the right hand sides of (34) to (36) cannot be equal. We therefore conclude: The paternalistic government disregards relative consumption altogether, that is, ∂ ∆ c /∂ c = 0. For this reason, the marginal rate of substitution of capital for consumption is the smallest for the market framework and differs from those of the government-frameworks. As a consequence, the Keynes-Ramsey rules differ between the market equilibrium and the governments' optima and so do the respective consumption-to-capital ratios as well as the endogenous growth rates.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, we finally address the question of whether positional preferences with respect to consumption give rise to over-or over-saving. The most efficient way is to work out the endogenous growth rate for all three frameworks. Noting that c/k = (A − δ) − g, we argue that g m < g i implies over-consumption, and g m > g i , i ∈ {w, p} implies over-saving.
Without loss of generality, we assume that u(c, ∆ c , k, .) is homogeneous of degreê R in k. 10 Moreover, we employ the following Lemma, which simplifies the the proceeding discussion enormously.
Lemma 1. Suppose, the endogenous growth rate is of the form
Proof. In equilibrium, c/k
where the sign follows from positivity of c/k.
The value of Lemma 1 is given by the fact that differences in Γ directly reveal differences in the endogenous growth rate g, ceteris paribus. A higher Γ implies a higher growth rate. In light of the above discussion we conclude: Γ m < Γ i implies over-consumption, and Γ m > Γ i , i ∈ {w, p} implies over-saving. We are now ready to state: 
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows an intuitive result. Consumption positionality leads to overconsumption. However, this intuition is misleading, as the over-consumption result neither necessarily holds in a framework without a preference for absolute wealth, nor it necessarily holds in a framework in which individuals also have a positional preference for wealth.
With a preference for absolute wealth and no positional preference for wealth, though, the market equilibrium implies over-consumption for both welfare criteria.
By not taking the externality into account, households overestimate the marginal utility of consumption. That is, they have a lower marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption than either the welfarist-or the paternalistic government. Consequently, in light of positional preferences with respect to consumption, households over-consume. In other words, households under-save, and the endogenous growth rate in the market economy is smaller than that for a welfarist-or paternalistic framework.
The difference between a welfarist-and a paternalistic government is given by the fact that the welfarist one considers the marginal disutility from the endogenous part of reference consumption, while the paternalistic one fully disregards relative consumption. So, ceteris paribus, marginal utility of consumption is higher for the welfarist government than for the paternalistic one. Consequently, the welfarist marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption is higher than the paternalistic one. This implies "over-consumption" of the welfarist government relative to the paternalistic one: (c/k) w > (c/k) p . Equivalently, the saving rate is higher for the paternalistic equilibrium than for the welfarist one, implying g p > g w .
Proposition 4 emphasizes two aspects of consumption positionality in the presence of preferences for absolute wealth. First, consumption positionality implies over-consumption, regardless of the respective welfare criterion. Second, consumption positionality implies a stronger distortion with respect to the paternalistic welfare criterion than with respect to the welfarist one. In what follows, we show that positional concerns with respect to wealth introduce a further distortion that is capable of offsetting the distortionary effect of relative consumption under wealth dependent preferences. Moreover, we show that according to a welfarist government positional preferences may lead to one distortion (say over-consumption) while, at the same time, they lead to the opposite distortion (over-saving) according to a paternalistic welfare criterion.
Positional concerns with respect to consumption and wealth
In contrast to the subsection above, here we consider the general case in which households have positional preferences not only with respect to consumption but also with respect to wealth. That is we consider u ∆c > 0 and u ∆ k > 0. We follow the methodology developed so far closely and introduce two more assumptions.
Considering the definition of ∆ k in (2), Assumption (A3) is equivalent to requiring the reference levelk f to be proportional to k. In fact, we assumē
where the parameter restriction ensures that in equilibrium relative wealth ∆ k in fact increases in k. Again, we consider Assumption (A3) to be a weak assumption on the co-movement between the home-(endogenous) and foreign (exogenous) components of the wealth reference level.
Assumptions (A3) and (A4) together have a direct interpretation in terms of the degree of positionality. More specifically, assume (A1) to (A4). Then, u ∆ k = η u k with η being a constant. Thus, the degree of positionality with respect to wealth, as given in (14), is constant and given by DOP k = η/(1 + η). Analytically,
where we use (A1) -(A4) together with Euler's theorem.
In the following, we adopt Assumptions (A1) to (A4). Based on the first-order conditions (11), (21), (29) as well as on the Euler equations (12), (22), (30), we state:
Proposition 5 (Non-distortion of positional preferences when u ∆ k (.) > 0). Assume (A1) to (A4).
Paternalistic government: If and only if η = κ, the market equilibrium path is efficient (according to the paternalistic welfare criterium) and positional preferences do not introduce a distortion.
Welfarist government: If and only if
the market equilibrium path is efficient (according to the welfarist welfare criterium) and positional preferences do not introduce a distortion.
Proof. See the appendix. The conditions in Proposition 5 ensure that the costate variables in the market framework and the governments' frameworks grow at the the same rates. This is the case when the distortion introduced by the consumption externality (positionality) is exactly counterbalanced by the distortion introduced by the wealth externality (positionality). In terms of the degrees of positionality, the proposition requires the marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption to be equal across the three frameworks (market, paternalistic, welfarist).
The reason for the conditions for the paternalistic government to differ from those for the welfarist government is that the latter does consider the endogenous parts of the reference levels in the marginal rate of substitution, while the former does not (we come back to this point below).
If preferences are positional with respect to wealth but not with respect to consumption, the market equilibrium path is always inefficient, that is, it never coincides with the socially optimal one.
The corollary follows directly from the fact that η = κ = 0. As preferences depend on relative wealth but not on relative consumption -as there is no counteracting positionality with respect to consumption -the positional preferences are always distortionary. Corollary 1 provides an interesting insight. While positional preferences for consumption alone need not be distortionary (cf. Proposition 1), positional preferences for wealth alone are always distortionary.
We conclude this section by analyzing the type of distortion (over-consumption or over-saving) caused by positional preferences. Interestingly, we will see that positional preferences may cause over-consumption according to one welfare criterion and, at the same time, over-saving according to the other welfare criterion.
As shown in the appendix, the endogenous growth rates are, as above, given by
where Ω −1 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which is the same for the market-, welfarist-and paternalistic governments). The specific terms Γ i (c/k) i represent the respective marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption. As in the previous section, we can apply Lemma 1, that is
in spite of endogeneity of the consumption-to-capital ratio (c/k) i . In contrast to the previous section, application of Lemma 1 does not yield a unique ranking among the Γ i , thereby among g i and (c/k) i , i ∈ {m, w, p}. 11 The following proposition identifies all possible rankings or distortions.
Proposition 6 (Welfare criteria, and the endogenous parts ofc andk). Assume (A1) to (A4). The positionality parameters give rise to four cases.
I. η = κ and α h = β h . There is no distortion according to either welfare criterion.
II. η = κ. There is no distortion according to the paternalistic welfare criterion.
There is a distortion according to the welfarist welfare criterion when α h = β h .
Specifically, α h > β h implies over-consumption; α h < β h implies over-saving.
III. η = κ and α h = β h . There is a distortion according to both welfare criteria.
Specifically, κ > η implies over-consumption; κ < η implies over-saving.
IV. η = κ and α h = β h . Specifically, let κ = nη and β h = aα h , with n, a > 0. , higher consumption-to-capital ratio than a welfarist government. In other words, households over-consume relative to the welfarist government. Over-consumption then implies a lower than optimal endogenous growth rate.
Case II gives rise to a most interesting observation.
Then changes in (α h , β h ) do not change the reference levels (c,k). Starting from α h = β h , and perturbing either of these parameters yields either over-consumption (if α h is increased) or over-saving (if β h is increased), for the same reference levels (c,k).
According to Case III, η = κ always introduces a distortion, though the distortion is stronger according to the paternalistic criterion as compared to the welfarist one (as the paternalistic government disregards positional preferences at all, while the welfarist government respects individual households' preferences). Clearly, κ > η implies over-consumption, as individual households are more positional with respect to consumption than with respect to wealth compared with both governments. A parallel argument applies to the case in which κ < η.
Case III implies a ranking according to which either (c/k
That is, positional preferences either imply overconsumption, or they imply over-saving.
Case IV shows that such rankings need not hold if both κ = η and α h = β h .
Specifically, positional preferences may imply over-consumption according to one welfare criterion and over-saving according to the other welfare criterion. Specifically, suppose κ > η and β h > α h -with the latter inequality being proportionally larger. Then, following the above arguments, β h > α h implies over-saving according to the welfarist criterion, and κ > η implies over-consumption according to both criteria. The condition given in the proposition ensures that the former effect dominates the latter effect, that is, there is over-consumption according to the paternalistic government (which does not care about α h and β h ), and there is oversaving according to the welfarist government. A parallel argument holds for Case IV.2.
Cases IV.1 and IV.2 raise serious questions regarding the (optimal) policy responses to positional preferences. Should a government follow a welfarist-or a paternalistic welfare criterion upon which to base its policy analysis? There is no easy answer to this question, as discussed in the introduction. In fact, the question is a philosophical one, it is not a purely economic one. The difficulty comes with the fact that, depending on the answer to this question, a government should apply one set of optimal policies rather than another one. In particular, in the presence of positional preferences, under the conditions of Case IV.1, a paternalistic government should apply a consumption tax while a welfarist government should apply a tax on capital income in order to correct for the externalities. The reverse holds for Case IV.2.
Conclusions
In an endogenous growth context with exogenous labor supply, this paper addresses the research question of whether or not positional preferences are distortionary, and if so, whether they cause over-consumption or over-saving. The paper shows that the answer depends on three main factors: the characteristics of the utility function (homogeneity characteristics); the type of the welfare criterion (welfarist or paternalistic); the endogenous-exogenous composition of the reference levels for consumption and wealth.
In our framework, labor supply is exogenous. In contrast to a neoclassical growth framework, as analyzed by the prior literature, we show that in an endogenous growth framework positional preferences may introduce inter-temporal distortions in spite of exogenous labor supply. Moreover, we prove that existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency. Efficiency, however, is ensured by a homogeneity restriction.
When households exhibit a preference for absolute wealth (and not a positional preference for wealth), then consumption positionality always introduces over-consumption (under both a welfarist-and a paternalistic government). This result is not robust, though, with respect to a framework in which households also have preferences for relative wealth, i.e., they are wealth positional. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for non-distortion of positional preferences in such a framework.
When households are positional, they consider reference points. These reference points are in part determined by the equilibrium in the home economy (e.g., the mean consumption level of the economy). However, they are also in part exogenous (e.g., mean consumption in a foreign country). It turns out that this "endogenousexogenous composition" of reference levels plays a key role for whether positional preferences imply over-consumption or over-saving according to a welfarist government. The reasoning is as follows. Individual households consider reference levels as exogenous, while the welfarist government internalizes the endogenous parts of the reference levels. Depending on their endogenous-exogenous composition, the welfarist government can have a higher-or a lower marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption, than an individual household.
In addition to a welfarist government, we also consider a paternalistic one that does not include "anti-social preferences", such as consumption-or wealth positionality in its social welfare function. We discuss two cases in particular. First, when the endogenous-exogenous composition is the same for both the consumption-and the wealth reference level, the distortion of positional preferences, if any, is stronger under a paternalistic government than under a welfarist one. This is because the former completely disregards any positional preferences, while the latter considers (the endogenous) part of the reference levels. Second, we identify the cases for which distortions raised by positional preferences imply over-consumption according to the welfarist criterion, while implying over-saving according to the paternalistic criterion. These cases involve restrictions on both, the degrees of positionality with respect to consumption or wealth as well as the endogenous-exogenous compositions of the reference levels.
A number of further research questions suggest themselves. First of all, which optimal policy should be chosen in those cases for which distortions raised by positional preferences imply over-consumption according to one welfare criterion, while Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope this study clarifies important aspects of distortionary effects of positional preferences, and can contribute to future discussions about the effects of positional preferences in economics.
From steps 1 to 3 we conclude that all equilibrium paths are identical, therefore the decentralized equilibrium path is efficient according to either the welfarist or the paternalistic welfare criterion.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let v(c, ∆ c ) ≡ u(c, ∆ c , ., .). Throughout we assume that (A1) is satisfied. Efficiency 
From this information, we first derive the marginal utility of consumption. In the proceeding step, we use the result to infer the utility function.
Step 1. Marginal utility
Step 2 (Paternalistic government). Following the reasoning above, the following must hold
where the first term on the left hand side represents the marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption in a market framework, and the term to the right of the equality sign represents the marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption for a paternalistic government. Together with (A1) -(A4), the condition is necessary and sufficient for positional preferences to be non-distortionary.
Step 3 (Welfarist government). Similarly, following the reasoning above, the following must hold:
